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ARTICLES
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND LAND USE CONTROL:
PRIVATE ZONING
Wilford Lundberg*
Promises concerning the use of land, once they have been elevated
to "covenants that run with the land," can and often do have a sub-
stantial impact on the maimer in which the state regulates land develop-
ment. While these covenants are the result of private bargaining be-
tween individuals who hold interests in real property, the state plays
the most significant role. State law determines which covenants are
enforceable; state courts are called upon to prescribe the manner of
their enforcement. When a court enforces a covenant within a grant,
it is placing the power of the state behind a regulation that was initially
promulgated in the private sector. In making this decision whether
or not to enforce a given covenant, there is often this dilemma: on
the one hand is the general policy that favors the orderly development
of land; on the other, a natural reluctance to enforce promises against
persons who never made them. The common law rules resulting from
nearly 400 years of litigation and statutory reform seek to chart the
course.
TO TOUCH OR IOT TO TOUCH
Basic to the enforcement of a covenant is the question of the
running of the burden. In Spencer's Case, decided in 1583,1 this issue
was faced directly. An action was brought against an assignee of a
lease which contained a promise to build a brick wall. Two principles
emerged from the decision. First, assignees must be expressly bound
by the original agreement if the promise concerns something not yet
in existence at the time the promise was made. This principle had an
early following in this country and was codified by David Dudley Field,
a codification adopted in Montana,2 as well as in California.3  The
second principle has had a far more substantial impact on the develop-
ment of the law: "but although the covenant be for him and his
assigns, yet if the thing to be done be merely collateral to the land,
and doth not touch or concern the thing demised in any sort, there
*Professor of Law, University of Montana. J. D. University of Southern
California Law Center, 1966.
'Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583).
'Section 58-308, R.C.M. 1947 provides that:
A covenant for the addition of some new thing to real property, or for the direct
benefit of some part of the property not then in existence or annexed thereto, when
contained in a grant of an estate in such property, and made by the covenanter
expressly for his assigns or to the assigns of the covenantee, runs with the land so
far as the assigns thus mentioned are concerned.
"CAL. CIv. COD. § 1464 (West 1954).
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the assignee shall not be charged."'4 The determination of which coven-
ants run with the land has in part then, for the past four centuries,
been directed towards the question whether or not a given promise
touches or concerns the land. Again the Field Code sought to simplify;
again Montana adopted its approach. ' It is submitted, however, that
a covenant which is made for the "direct benefit of the property or
some part of it then in existence"-language found in § 58-306, R.C.M.
1947-is not significantly different from the test of "touch or concern."
The discretion given the court in either case is just as broad. The
Restatement of Property is some help ;6 case law, admittedly not always
clear, offers a rich background against which a question may be con-
sidered.
Whether or not a given burden runs with the land is further
refined by making a distinction between those burdens that impose
restrictions on the use of the land and those burdens which impose
affirmative duties on the owners of land. It is with these affirmative
duties that the courts have had the greatest difficulty in finding that
the burden touches or concerns the land. An example of this can be
found in the 1913 case of Miller v. Clary.7 The court there summarily
announced that any covenant which imposes an affirmative duty, as
distinguished from compliance with a mere restriction, does not run
with the land. At issue was a promise to construct and maintain a
shaft for purposes of carrying electrical power. The court, forced to
distinguish its decision from earlier authority, recognized exceptions
to its announced rule. These exceptions related to covenants to build
fences, covenants relating to party walls, covenants to provide railroad
crossings, covenants to pay rent, and covenants to make repairs. It
has been suggested that during the twenty-five years that separated
'Spencer 's Case, s-upra note 1 at 72.
5The Field Code codification is contained in the fultowung three statutes:
1. Section 58-305, R.C.M. 1947 provides that: "The only covenants which run
with the land are those specified in this chapter, and those which are incidental there-
to.''
2. Section 58-306, R.C.M. 1947 provides that: "Every covenant contained in a
grant of an estate in real property, which is made for the direct benefit of the prop-
erty, or some part of it then in existence, runs with the land."
3. Section 58-307, R.CM. 1947 provides that: "The last section includes cove-
nants of warranty, for quiet enjoyment, or for further assurance on the part of the
grantor, and covenants for the payment of rent, or of taxes or assessments upon the
land, on the part of a grantee."
6THE RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 (1944) describes the "touch or concern" test
as follows:
The successors in title to land respecting the use of which the owner has made a
promise can be bound as promisors only if(a) the performance of the promise will benefit the promisee or other bene-
ficiary of the promise in the physical use or enjoyment of the land possessed by
him, or
(b) the consummation of the transaction of which the promise is a part will
operate to benefit and is for the benefit of the promisor in the physical use or
enjoyment of land possessed by him,
and the burden on the land of the promisor bears a reasonable relation to the
benefit received by the person benefited.
WMiller v. Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913).
[Vol. 34
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Miller v. Clary from Neponsit Property Owners Association v. Emigrant
Industrial Savings Bank,8 the lower courts generally interpreted the
facts before them so as to avoid the rule of Miller.9 Neponsit involved
an action to foreclose a lien brought by a homeowner's association against
a property owner for charges which had been assessed against the prop-
erty pursuant to a covenant in the chain of title which allowed the
association to make assessments for purposes of maintaining roads, paths,
parks, beaches, sewers, and "such other public purposes as shall from
time to time be determined." The court concurred with Judge Charles
E. Clark with respect to the difficulty of applying the touch or concern
test: "it has been found impossible to state any absolute test to deter-
mine what covenants touch and concern land and what do not. The
question is one for the court to determine in the exercise of its best
judgment upon the facts of each case." 10 Coming to grips with the
decision that had been made in Miller v. Clary, the Neponsit court,
after referring to the exceptions and limitations that had been placed
upon the rule, said:
It may be difficult to classify these exceptions or to formulate a
test of whether a particular covenant to pay money or to perform
some other act falls within the general rule that ordinarily an
affirmative covenant is a personal and not a real covenant, or falls
outside the limitations placed upon the general rule. At least it
must touch or concern the land in a substantial degree, and though
it may be inexpedient and perhaps impossible to formulate a rigid
test or definition which will be entirely satisfactory or which can
be applied mechanically in all cases, we should at least be able
to state the problem and find a reasonable method of approach
to it.'
The court went on to point out that a promise to pay for something
to be done was not really distinguishable from a promise to do some-
thing on the land. Therefore, unless technical form were to be exalted
over substance, the distinction between covenants which can be enforced
as running with the land and those which are merely personal to the
covenantor must depend upon the effect that the particular promise
has on the legal rights which otherwise would flow from the ownership
of the land and which are connected to the land. The question that
had to be answered was: ". . . does the covenant in purpose and effect
substantially alter these rights ?",12
Judge Clark's influence upon this decision was enormous. Heavy
reliance was, however, placed upon Professor Bigelow who, according to
Neponsit Property Owners Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 278 N.Y.
248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
gC. BERGEBr, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 434 (1968). The author acknowledges his in-
debtedness to Professor Berger for his masterful organization of materials relevant
to this paper.
-0C. CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTEREST RUNNING WITH LAND 96-97 (1947).
Neponsit Property Owners Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, supra
note 8 at 796.
"But, "the ghost of Miller v. Clary dies hard." See, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE, supra
note 9 at 446.
1973]
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Clark, "set forth a scientific method of approach to the problem which
seems to afford the most practical working test for the court to
employ."'1 3 This scientific method of Professor Bigelow's is to
, ascertain the exact effect of the covenant upon the legal
relations of the parties. In effect it is a measuring of the legal
relations of the parties with and without the covenant. If the
promissor's legal relations in respect to the land in question are
lessened-his legal interest as owner rendered less valuable by the
promise-the burden of the covenant touches or concerns the land;
if the promissee's legal relations in respect to that land are in-
creased-his legal interest as owner rendered more valuable by
the promise-the benefit of the covenant touches or concerns that
land. It is necessary that this effect should be had upon the legal
relations of the parties as owners of the land in question, and not
merely as members of the community in general."
While it is true that the court in Neponsit found this test helpful, there
still remains a nagging question. Assuming a covenant which imposes
an affirmative duty will run with the land because it touches or con-
cerns the land when the covenant substantially alters the legal rights
that flow from ownership in the land, the question arises: when are
those legal rights substantially altered? Can it be said that persons
who enter into an unenforceable contract have substantially altered
their legal rights? Is it not true that these legal rights become altered
only when the contract itself has become enforceable in a court of law?
Perhaps an extension of Professor Hohfeld's right-duty relationship can
be used to explain the existence of a legal right which has become sub-
stantially altered by the existence of a promise even before a court has
announced that that promise is legally enforceable. It is submitted,
however, that the Bigelow test as used in Neponsit is in reality saying
that once a court has decided that a particular promise is enforceable,
then it has by its decision altered the legal rights-thereby fulfilling
the test. There is no doubt that such a test allows a court to adopt a
liberal approach when faced with questions of this nature, uninhibited
by the reasoning in Miller v. Clary, but it is less likely that such a test
furnishes a court with a large measure of guidance.' 5
PRIVITY OF ESTATE
The existence of a promissee and a promissor assumes privity of
contract. If the promise, even though it does touch or concern the land,
is to be enforced against the owner of the land to which the promise
"COVENANTS AND INTEREST RuNNING WiTH LAND, supra note 10 at 97.
"Id. at 97-98.15See, Note, Affirmative Duties Running with the Land, 35 N.Y.UJ.L. REv. 1344 (1960)
at 1365-1369 for a summary of the manner in which states treat affirmative duties
either by statutes or decisions. The helpfulness of this annotation can, in part, be
measured by the way in which Montana is treated at 1366-67:
Montana: An affirmative duty is enforceable as a real covenant. MONT. ltnv.
CODES ANN. § 58-307 (1947). Running covenants are governed by MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. §§ 58-304 to -311 (1947). To be enforceable as a real covenant, there
must be instantaneous privity. MONT. REV. CODES § 58-304 (1947). Servitudes
which will attach to the land are controlled by MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 67-601(1947).
[Vol. 34
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 34 [1973], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol34/iss2/1
1973] RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
has attached, an owner who was not the original promissor, there must
also be privity of estate. This is a requirement with which Judge Clark
took exception.
As a matter of policy and reason, the requirement seems an
anomaly. The requirement of privity is designed to furnish a
connecting link between the parties. That is already supplied be-
tween the covenantor and the convenantee by the promise itself.
The need is to justify the transfer of the right or duty created
by the promise not to justify the promise itself. The practical
effect of requiring such privity is that there should be a conveyance
between covenantor and covenantee at the time of making the
covenant."
What Judge Clark was postulating was that the logical extension of
the privity of estate requirement was that no privity of estate could be
found with respect to a promise unless that promise was in fact made
at a time when a tenurial relationship existed. This particular require-
ment was the basis for the so-called horizontal privity of estate which
is exemplified by the 1871 case of Wheeler v. Schad.17 In Wheeler the
burden was unenforceable because the covenant had not been inserted
in the deed but had been drawn up six days later between the grantor
and grantee. One can only agree with Judge Clark that such a decision
surely cannot be justified. California responded to this privity require-
ment by enacting CAL. CrV. CODE § 1468 (West 1954)."' It is at least
arguable that had not the requirement of Wheeler v. Schad been made,
this particular section would not have been necessary. This legislative
solution gave California courts another problem in Marra v. Aetna Con-
struction Company,19 a case in which the assignee of the grantor tried
to enforce building restrictions. In a reverse twist of Wheeler v. Schad,
the California Supreme Court refused to enforce the restrictions because
they were not agreed upon between landowners, but rather between
grantor and grantee, the grantee being the promissor.20  The court
1 COVENANTS AND INTEREST RUNNING WITH LAND, supra note 10 at 117.
"rWheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 863 (1871).
"8This section, which has no counterpart in Montana, provides:
Covenants running with land of both covenantor and covenantee. A covenant
made by the owner of land with the owner of other land to do or refrain from
doing some act on his own land, which doing or refraining is expressed to be for
the benefit of the land of the covenantee, and which is made by the covenantor
expressly for his assigns or to the assigns of covenantee, runs with both of such
parcels of land.
"Marra v. Aetna Construction Company, 15 Cal.2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940).
UCAL. CIV. CODE § 1468 (West 1973 Supp.) was amended in 1968 and 1969 and it now
provides:
Covenants running with land of both covenator and covenantee; successive owners.
Each covenant, made by an owner of land with the owner of other land or made by
a grantor of land with the grantee of land conveyed, or made by the grantee of
land conveyed with the grantor thereof, to do or refrain from doing some act on
his own land, which doing or refraining is expressed to be for the benefit of the
land of the covenantee, runs with both the land owned by or granted to the
covenantor and the land owned by or granted to the covenantee and shall, except
as provided by Section 1466, or as specifically provided in the instrument creating
such covenant, and notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1465, benefit or be
binding upon each successive owner, during his ownership, of any portion of such
land affected thereby and upon each person having any interest therein derived
through any owner thereof where all of the following requirements are met: 5
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in Marra found that the covenant, if it was to be enforced at all, had
to be enforced under CAL. CIv. CODE § 1462 (West 1954), the parent of
§ 58-306, R.C.M. 1947. Since it was determined that the covenant was
of no benefit to the land, the court refused to enforce it, giving as one
of the reasons the fact that the property and the neighborhood in gen-
eral had changed substantially since the promise was made. It seems
that the court found that the covenant in form was a covenant which
ran with the land, but that its enforceability was lost due to changed
conditions. In any event, the existence of § 1468 proved fatal to the
plaintiff in Marra,21 and as such, it is another argument against any
retention of the requirement of horizontal privity of estate. It has been
generally accepted that this particular requirement is now dead,2 2 even
though it has been incorporated into the Restatement of Property.23
If logic dictates that the requirement of privity of estate leads to
the decision in Wheeler v. Schad, then logic must either be disregarded
or modified when attempting to define privity of estate in some work-
able fashion. It may well be that the requirement will be relaxed when
social policy dictates that a particular promise ought to be performed.
If that is the case, the examination as to whether or not privity exists
ought to be made with respect to the persons who are before the court
pursuant to the enforceability of a given promise. If they are the
original promissor and promissee, there is no problem. If they are
successors in interest to a promissor and promissee who are also grantor
and grantee, then again, even according to the strictest view, there is no
(a) The land of the covenantor which is to be affected by such covenants, and
the land of covenantee to be benefited, are particularly described in the instrument
containing such covenants;
(b) Such successive owners of the land are in such instrument expressed to
be bound thereby for the benefit of the land owned by, granted by, or granted
to the covenantee;
(c) Each such act relates to the use, repair, maintenance or improvement of,
or payment of taxes and assessments on, such land or some part thereof;
(d) The instrument containing such covenants is recorded in the office of
the recorder of each county in which such land or some part thereof is situated.
Where several persons are subject to the burden of any such covenant, it shall be
apportioned among them pursuant to Section 1467, except that where only a
portion of such land is so affected thereby, such apportionment shall be only
among the several owners of such portion. This section shall apply to the mort-
gagee, trustee or beneficiary of a mortgage or deed of trust upon such land or
any part thereof while but only while he, in such capacity, is in possession
thereof.
2For a discussion of the Marra problem and subsequent history of § 1468, see, Note,
California's New Legislative Approach to Covenants Running with the Land, 9 SANTA
CLARA LAWYER 285 (1968).
2" [T]he decisions actually applying the requirement to defeat a recovery are com-
paratively few." COVENANTS AND INTEREST RUNNING WITH LAND, supra note 10 at 116.
mThe RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 534 (1944) provides that:
The successors in title to land respecting the use of which the owner has made a
promise are not bound as promisors upon the promise unless
(a) the transaction of which the promise is a part includes a transfer of an
interest either in the land benefited by or in the land burdened by the perform-
ance of the promise; or
(b) the promise is made in the adjustment of the mutual relationships arising
out of the existence of an easement held by one of the parties to the promise
in the land of the other.
[Vol. 34
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problem. To cover other situations, privity may be examined from
another point of view. For example, there is the Massachusetts view
holding that privity of estate exists when there is a simultaneous exist-
ence of interests in both parties in the same land.24 This means that
a covenant is enforceable if it is made between the covenantor and
covenantee at the time when each holds an interest in the property to
which the promise attaches. This rule seems more implicit than explicit
in the leading case of Morse v. Aldrich,25 and seems to require the exist-
ence of something like an easement before a promise can be enforceable.
If there really is an easement, obviously privity of estate exists. Judge
Clark has suggested that what the Massachusetts rule does is merely
shut out covenants which are really either benefits or burdens held in
gross.26 If that is true, the Massachusetts rule goes about half way in
furthering the policy of striking promises which encumber titles, but,
as has been suggested by Professor Powell, can lead to harsh results.2 7
Furthermore, the Massachusetts rule has to be viewed with respect to
the fact that there has been in that jurisdiction a surprising development
of affirmative or "spurious" easements. 28
Another approach to the problem of defining privity is to view it
as existing when there has been a succession of interests between the
promissor and promissee. Judge Clark took this view to task in 165
Broadway Bldg. v. City Investing Company:
[Tihat the parties to an action to enforce a covenant, if not them-
selves makers of the contract, must each have succeeded by privity
to the estate of one of such makers is good enough sense; it is why
we say a covenant runs with such estate. But to go further and
require that there must be some such succession between the coven-
anting parties themselves-that there must have been a grant or
conveyance between them at the time of the covenant or possibly
some continuing interest of tenure, easement or otherwise-is
supported neither by ancient law nor by modern policy.'
Judge Clark's view was that privity of estate requires "only that the
person presently claiming the benefit or being subjected to the burden,
shall be shown to be the successor to the interest of the original person
so benefitted or burdened. °30 This view was adopted by the Restatement
of Property with respect to the running of the benefit of a promise.81
21R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 714 (Rohan, abr. ed. 1968); H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
368-369 (Abr. 3d ed. 1970).
'Morse v. Aldrich, 36 Mass. 449 (1837).
2COV ENANTS AND INTEREST RUNNING WITH LAND, supra note 10 at 134.
"See, discussion of Consolidated Ariz. Smelting Co. v. Rinchman, 212 F. 813 (1st Cir.
1914), a case which refused to enforce a promise to pay a share of the profits of a
mining operating until the purchase price of the property had been satisfied on the
grounds that the promise did not pass to successors of the promissor, in R. POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY, supra note 24 at 715.
OSCOVENANTS AND INTEREST RUNNING WITH LAND, supra note 10 at 135.
1165 Broadway Bldg. v. City Investing Company, 120 F.2d 813, 816-817 (2d Cir. 1941).
'R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, supra note 24 at 715.
"RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 547 and 548 (1944). Section 547 provides: "The
benefit of a promise respecting the use of land of the beneficiary of the promise
can run with the land only to one who succeeds to some interest of the beneficiary
19731
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The Restatement then took another position with regard to the running
of the burden-privity can only be met by either the Massachusetts
doctrine of simultaneous interests or the presence of a succession of
interests between the promising parties.3 2 Judge Clark took vigorous
exception to making a distinction between the running of benefits and
of burdens.33
The statutory rules on the privity requirement in Montana are
found in Chapter 3 of Title 58, R.C.M. 1947. Since privity of estate is
not expressly defined in this chapter, it becomes necessary to pair the
statutory provisions for purposes of deciding whether or not the statu-
tory material even contemplates the requirement. Section 58-304, R.C.M.
1947, for example, states that "certain covenants, contained in grants of
estates in real property, are pertinent to such estates, and pass with
them, so as to bind the assigns of the covenantor and to vest in the
assigns of the covenantee, in the same manner as if they had personally
entered into them." Additionally, § 58-306, R.C.M. 1947, which codified
the touch or concern requirement from Spencer's Case, refers to coven-
ants as "contained in a grant of an estate in real property." The third
section is § 58-309, R.C.M. 1947 which states: "a covenant running
with the land binds those only who acquire the whole estate of the
convenantor in some part of the property." It can be argued that
§ 58-309, R.C.M. 1947 expresses the Montana privity requirement: a
covenant binds anyone who acquires land to which a promise is attached.
A promise attaches when it is made for the direct benefit of the prop-
erty or when it comes within § 58-307., R.C.M. 1947.34 A problem, how-
in the land respecting the use of which the promise was made."' Section 548 provides:
"It is not essential to the running of the benefit of a promise respecting the use
of land of the promisee or other person entitled to the benefit of the promise that
there be any privity between the promisor and the promisee other than that arising out
of the promise."
"RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 534 (1944) provides that:
The successors in title to land respecting the use of which the owner has made a
promise are not bound as promisors upon the promise unless
(a) the transaction of which the promise is a part includes a transfer of an
interest either in the land benefited by or in the land burdened by the perform-
ance of the promise; or
(b) the promise is made in the adjustment of the mutual relationships arising
out of the existence of an easement held by one of the parties to the promise
in the land of the other.
•"'After excluding party-wall cases, Professor Powell concludes that the law with regard
to this distinction indicates that
[T]here are decisions in twenty-seven jurisdictions which support or tend to sup-
port some requirement of privity in the running of burdens, more rigorous than
is consistent with Judge Clark's position. In Massachusetts, there is the tight
requirement of the simultaneous existence of interests on both parties in the same
land. In the fourt states of New Jersey, New York, Virginia, and West Virginia
the requirement connotes a tenurial relation between promisor and promisee. In
twenty-two states, the requirement is phrased either in the Massachusetts form,
or in terms of a succession in interest between the promisor and promisee. In
contrast to these twenty-seven states, which to some degree support the Restate-
ment's insistence that the requirement of privity is not extinct, there are decisions
in three states which support, or tend to support, Judge Clark's position. R.
POwELL, REAL PROPERTY, supra note 24 at 71.6.
'
4See, supra at note 5. 8
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ever, lies in the fact that both §§ 58-304 and 58-306, R.C.M. 1947
expressly require that a covenant, before it can attach, must be con-
tained in a grant. A strict reading of the statutes would indicate that
Montana's concept of privity of estate is as strict as that of Wheeler
v. Schad. Support for this interpretation can be inferentially gained
from the California experiment, discussed above. Since California has
a statute identical to § 58-306, R.C.M. 1947,35 why was it necessary for
California to enact additional legislation which expressly provided for
privity of estate between adjoining landowners who enter into agree-
ments? The difficulty California has had with that section has already
been discussed. One authority 6 has cited a Montana case, Herigstad v.
Hardrock Oil Co.,37 for the proposition that no grant is necessary for
privity of estate to exist. But it is important to note that this case
involved the extraction of a promise in an operating agreement pursuant
to a permit to prospect for oil and gas prior to the securing of a lease
by the promissee. The court went to great length to point out that a
permit for prospecting for oil and gas was a valuable right which took
on the character of an interest or an estate in land. Furthermore, the
court pointed out that the operating agreement, the document in which
the promise had in fact been included, was more than a mere license.
In fact, the court labelled the agreement a lease which had the effect of
vesting exclusive control of the premises in the grantee. The court did
not say that a grant of an estate is necessary to satisfy the privity
requirement, but this seems implicit in the finding of the existence
of a grant even though the grant was less than a fee. Herigstad does
not really come to grips with the question whether or not Montana
statutes recognize only one kind of privity, or conversely, whether privity
may exist where there has been no grant.
ENFORCEABILITY IN EQUITY
Since the 1848 case of Tulk v. Moxhay, 3 courts have expanded
equitable jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing promises without care-
fully inquiring into the existence of either the privity of estate or the
touch or concern requirements. Basic to equitable enforcement of these
promises is the principle that courts will enforce promises concerning
the use of a piece of land against persons who took with notice of
the promise. These promises have been found to be enforceable in many
areas, but most particularly in situations in which the land has been a
part of a general building scheme. Operative facts which are necessary
to justify the finding of a general building development scheme are:
"CAL. Crv. CODE § 1462 (West 1954).
3Sims, The Law of Real Covenants: Exceptions to the Restatement of the Subject by
the American Law Institute, 30 CoRN. L. Q. 1, 32 (1944).
'Herigstad v. Hardrock Oil Co., 101 Mont. 22, 52 P.2d 171 (935).
mTnlfk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1.143 (1848).
1973]
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An intent on the part of the original grantor to establish a plan
must be found from his language and conduct, read against the
background of existing circumstances. The area covered by the
scheme must be so defined as to be clearly ascertainable. There
must be reasonable multuality of benefit in applying the restric-
tion to the separate parcels within the defined area. The restrictions
need not be identical and do not have to apply to every lot in the
affected area, but there must be a reasonable uniformity in their
applicability.'
In these situations, the subsequent purchaser from a common grantor
can enforce the restrictions against prior purchasers if the restrictions
existed at the time of the prior purchase. The prior purchaser can then
enforce restrictions against subsequent purchasers if the building de-
velopment scheme existed at the time of the prior purchase. The reason
for this is often found in the fact that courts find that the existence of
the scheme imposes a servitude or easement upon the retained land,
allowing successors in interest to the retained land who take with
notice of the restriction to be either burdened or benefitted thereby.
In some instances, the holder of land so burdened may in fact find him-
self liable on the promise even though he subsequently parts with con-
trol of the land. This question has been answered differently in Mon-
tana, however, where by statute it is provided: "No one, merely by
reason of having acquired an estate subject to a covenant running with
the land, is liable for breach of the covenant before he acquires the
estate, or after he has parted with it or ceased to enjoy its benefits." 40
The existence of the remedy of enforcing promises against takers of
land with notice of the promise is generally based upon the court's
finding of an equitable servitude. This requires that Tulk v. Moxhay,
a case in which a promise to maintain a park was enforced against
successors in interest to the original promissor even though the court
specifically excluded from its consideration the question as to whether
or not the covenant ran with the land, be interpreted as a property
rather than a contract theory case. Under the property theory,
[A] contract by the owner of the land that he will use or abstain
from using his land in a particular way creates in the promissee
an equitable property interest in the burdened land. The existence
of a property interest means that the promissee holds certain equit-
able rights in rem against the entire world in respect to the use of
this land. Since rights in rem can create only relative negative
duties in members of the public, every third person whether in
possession of the burdened land or not is under a negative duty to
uContinuing, Professor Powell states:
Some circumstances help to establish the existence of a building development
scheme. These include: (1) The fact that the common grantor sells or states
his intention to put on the market an entire tract of land; (2) The exhibiting
of a map or plat of the entire tract at the time of the sale of one of the
parcels of land involved; (3) The actual development of the tract in accordance
with the claimed restrictions; and (4) a substantial uniformity in the restrictions
imposed in the deeds executed by the common grantor. R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY,
supra note 24 at 726-727. See al., W. BLJRHY, REAL PROPERTY 104 (3d ed. 1965).
"Section 58-310, R.C.M. 1947.
[Vol. 34
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abstain from using the land in a manner inconsistent with the con-
tract, unless he can bring himself within the equitable defense of
purchaser without notice."
This justifies the enforcement of promises which are negative in nature,
but it does not provide a justification for the enforcement of affirmative
duties. A contract theory could explain the enforcement of affirmative
duties through the doctrine of specific performance of contracts; the
only way in which a property theory can explain the existence of such
an enforcement right is by attaching to the burdened land a real obli-
gation which passes to all subsequent possessors who take with notice.
This obligation which attaches is a servitude or "spurious" easement,
transformed into a duty when a promissee seeks its enforcement. 42
Whether the duty attaches to the land as an equitable servitude by
force of a court's decision in enforcing the duty, or whether the duty
attaches as an easement by force of the promise itself is an interesting
question. That question was raised in Trustees of Columbia College v.
Lynch 43 which followed Tulk v. Moxhay by about 30 years. The court
said:
[A] covenant by the owner, upon a good consideration, to use, or
to refrain from using, his premises in a particular manner, for the
benefit of premises owned by the covenantor, is, in effect, a grant
of an easement, and the right to the enjoyment of it will pass as
appurtenant to the premises in respect of which it was created."
THE PROMISE AS AN EASEMENT
The distinction between negative easements and equitable servitudes
may be more conceptual than real. If, as in Columbia College, a promise
is viewed as a grant of an easement, whether that easement be a grant
of a right to use property or merely a grant of a right against another
piece of property that it be used or not be used in a certain way, then
there is no question but what there has come into existence by virtue
of the promise the dominant and servient tenements to which both
the benefit and the burden may attach as if a negative easement were
in fact created.
It can be argued that since easements are interests in land, they
can only be created by some form of a grant in writing.45 Any strict
requirement of a writing to create an easement, however, must conflict
with common law tradition. Easements by necessity, for example, have
always been allowed at common law. An easement by necessity is found
to exist where there was originally unity of ownership and a real neces-
sity exists to use the servient parcel for the benefit of the dominant
"Reno, The Enforcement of Equilable Servitudes in Ldad, 28 VA. L. REV. 951, 976
(1942).
121d at 977.
"Trustees at Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440 (1877).
"Id. at 447.
'This seems implicit in Simonson v. MacDonald, 131 Mont. 494, 311 P;2d 982 (1957)..
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parcel. The usual argument in cases involving this question revolve
around the degree of necessity. 46 Additionally, there are easements by
implication. Often easements by necessity and easements by implication
are lumped together,4 7 creating problems by failing sufficiently to take
into account the unique function of an easement by necessity. One of
these problems was highlighted in the Montana case of Simonson v. Mac-
Donald. By strictly interpreting § 67-1616, R.C.M. 1947,48 the court
held that there can be no implied easements in Montana. The effect of
the decision in that case, however, was to refuse a request for an ease-
ment by necessity. Had the distinction between the two easements
been recognized, the problem of implied easements could have been
avoided.
The holding in Simonson was later reconsidered in Thisted v. Country
Club Tower Corporation .49  This case concerned the classic negative
easement situation. A builder who was constructing a high-rise building
pursuant to a general building development scheme sold units to early
purchasers who took pursuant to a contract which contained promises
that the building was to be devoted to residential apartments. Later the
builder decided to change his mind and convert some of the units into
commercial units. The question was whether the prior purchasers could
enforce the promises against the successor to the builder. Should the
promises be enforced as covenants that run with the land? Should the
promises be viewed as implied negative easements which attach to the
land that the seller retained? Should equity enforce a promise against
a successor who took with notice of the restriction and thereby impose
-R.. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, supra note 24 at 545.
'"The RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 476 (1944) takes this position by providing:
Factors Determining Implication of Easements. In determining whether the cir-
cumstances under which a conveyance of land is made imply an easement, the
following factors are important
(a) whether the claimant is the conveyor or the conveyee,
(b) the terms of the conveyance,
(c) the consideration given for it,
(d) whether the claim is made against a simultaneous conveyee,
(e) the extent of necessity of the easement to the claimant,
(f) whether reciprocal benefits result to the conveyorand the conveyee,
(g) the manner in which the land was used prior to its conveyance, and
(h) the extent to which the manner of prior use was or might have been
known to the parties.
"This section provides:
From the use of the word 'grant" in any conveyance by which an estate of
inheritance or fee simple or possessory title is to be passed, the following
covenants, and none other, on the part of the grantor for himself and his heirs
to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, are implied, unless restrained by express
terms contained in such conveyance:
1. That previous to the time of the execution of such conveyance, the grantor
has not conveyed the same estate, or any right, title, or interest therein, to any
person other than the grantee.
2. That such estate is at the time of the execution of such conveyance free
from encumbrances done, made, or suffered by the grantor, or any person
claiming under him.
Such covenants may be sued upon in the same manner as if they had been
expressly inserted in the conveyance.
"Thisted v. Country Club Tower Corporation, 146 Mont. 87, 405 P.2d 432 (1965).
[Vol. 34
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an equitable servitude? The promise was enforced, but the court used
language which makes it difficult accurately to determine which theory
was utilized. It also overruled Simonson insofar as that case might bc
inconsistent with Thisted's holding.50 It may well be that the Thisted
decision is not at all inconsistent with Simonson. If the Thisted case is
viewed as a case in which the prior purchaser from a common grantor
is merely seeking to enforce a restriction against a subsequent purchaser
who took with notice, then he may do so by showing that the restriction
existed in the general building development scheme at the time that
he took his property interest. Such a restriction can be enforced either
on the basis of an implied negative easement or on the basis of an equit-
able servitude under the theory of Tulk v. Moxhay. If the restriction
is a negative easement, it can be raised by implication since the grantor
has made a conveyance extracting a promise from his grantee, a promise
which is for purposes of implementing the general building scheme. The
same promise is then levied against the land retained by the grantor,
and becomes enforceable against successors in interest to the grantor.
As the grantor parts with his interest in the property, usually to sev-
eral successors, he ceases to be liable ol it pursuant to §§ 58-309 and 58-
310, R.C.M. 1947, and the burden becomes apportioned among the
persons who acquire his interest.5 '
NEGATIVE EASEMENTS OR EQUITABLE SERVITUDES:
EITHER/OR?
If the negative easement theory is the theory of Thisted, it is
extremely difficult to find any real relationship between it and the
fact situation that was posed in Simonson. Easements by necessity are
different from reciprocal negative easements, whether those negative
easements are imposed by grant or whether they are raised by impli-
cation from a grant. But what of the difference between implied ease-
ments and equitable servitudes? As noted previously, courts have on
occasion found it relatively simple to convert a promise into a grant
of an easement for purposes of (nforcing what would otherwise be
considered an equitable servitude. There is, however, a very real differ-
ence between the two, even though once the promise is enforced, the
practical effect is to obliterate the distinctions. It is in the enforcement
of the promise where the difference becomes clear. If the promise is
actually an easement. whether that easement is termed one which has
OSee, Note, "eciprocal Negative Rasevent" lIMplied from Contract, Deed, and Gen-
eral Building Plan, 27 MONT. L. REv. 91 (1965). See also, Northwestern Improvement
Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289, 66 P.2d 792 (1937), where the court found that the
presence of a restrictive covenant created a negative easement.
tmSection 58-311, R.C.M. 1947, provides:
Where several persons, holding by several titles, are subject to the burden or
entitled to the benefits of a covenant running ith the land, it must be appor-
tioned among them according to the value of the property subject to it held by
them respectively, if such value can be ascertained, and if not, then according
to their respective interests in point of quantity.
1973']
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been raised by grant, by implication, or in some other fashion, then
there is ready enforcement of it in courts of law as any interest in
property is enforced. If, however, the promise is viewed as a possible
equitable servitude, a court sitting in equity must find it enforceable.
This means that the usual requirements for equity jurisdiction must be
met. Furthermore, the equitable defenses of taker without notice, laches,
unclean hands, etc. become operative in enforcing equitable servitudes.
Equitable servitudes are imposed after the fact; it is by the finding of
the enforcement of the promise that the equitable servitude becomes
enforceable. The easement was always enforceable-the court merely
provides a legal remedy to enforce a right held by one person against
someone else who holds a corresponding duty to him.
Whether a covenant is an easement by virtue of its own impact
or by virtue of some later judicial decree of a court sitting in equity
is of little importance once its enforcement has in fact been granted.
It is, however, of importance to developers who are concerned with the
orderly and predictable development of property. When a typical de-
veloper carves out a piece of ground upon which he visualizes some
sort of community emerging in the future, his concern must center
around the certainty with which his restrictions will be enforced in the
future. It is a relatively simple process for him to insert within his
deeds restrictive covenants which are couched in proper form; that is,
form which recites the necessary intention to run with the land as
well as form which raises the promise so that it will meet the test of
touch or concern. Our recording statutes offer him an opportunity to
insure that his promises are on record notice for the entire world.
Should he run into financial difficulty before the development is com-
pleted, then he is faced with the problem of the possible implication of
easements on his retained property. That is one of the risks that he
assumes, and it is implicit in the Thisted case.
What happens, though, when the developer has conveyed all of
his interest in the tract and he seeks to enforce promises within his
conveyances, promises which are being broken by his grantees but which
are not being enforced by any of the other grantees? Normally, such
a grantor is not entitled to enforce the covenant because to do so would
be to lend enforceability to covenants in gross.5 2 There is, however, the
case of VanSandt v. Rose,53 in which a grantor was allowed to enforce
a promise against his grantee even though the grantor had retained
ownership in no surrounding land. Admittedly, this is an extreme po-
sition, but viewed with Neponsit it can no longer be taken as axiomatic
that covenants in gross are unenforceable in the United States. A
covenant which raised an affirmative duty was enforced in Neponsit
5The English view at least, has been that benefits may not be held in gross. LAND
OWNERSHIP AND USE, supra note 9 at 481.
6VanSandt v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913).
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by a property owners' association, a corporate body which had been
organized to receive money assessed against the property owners, even
though this association had at some prior time conveyed away the
property for which the assessments had been made. The streets, parks,
playgrounds, and beaches had been dedicated to the public. The court
sought to compare its holding with that in Columbia College, because in
that decision it was held that there was no need for privity of estate
to exist. It is to be remembered, however, that Columbia College found
the existence of an equitable servitude which had been formed by an
agreement entered into between adjoining proprty owners. No equitable
servitude was found in Neponsit. Arguably, the case does support the
proposition that covenants in gross may be enforced.54
A developer's best prospect is probably to enforce the promise as
an equitable servitude. Assuming he can overcome the obstacles of
equity jurisdiction, he need only show that the promise was one with
which the particular defendant took with notice. As noted previously,
a promise may be converted into a grant of a servitude. Enforcement
of a covenant in its pure form still requires privity of estate as well
as a purpose that touches or concerns the land. True, the touch and
concern requirement has been diluted to a point where it is argueable
whether it still exists. Furthermore, whether to continue the privity
requirement, particularly as it relates to burdens, may in the words of
Professor Powell depend
... on the decision of the question of social value. If one believes
the burdens to be generally objectionable, since they impose restric-
tions on persons who never made a promise, and since they restrict
the free use and alienability of land, the continuance of a pre-
requisite of privity will lessen their importance. If, on the other
hand, one believes that the burdens generally serve socially useful
ends, and aid rather than hinder the alienability of land, the result
will be a readiness to minimize or to emasculate the prerequisite of
privity, so that more can run as to burden.'
In reality, it is probably better to look at the promise that is sought
to be enforced from the point of view of whether the particular promise
does in fact aid in the orderly development of land. In the public
sector, for example, the general zoning power is circumscribed within
the parameters of the police power. To promote public health, safety,
welfare, morals and convenience is one way of saying that the state
may not exceed certain bounds when it exercises its power for purposes
of regulating the use of private property. Granted these limits are
vague, but the concept of police power has provided a workable frame-
work within which a balance can be struck between the concept of
private property and the interest of the state in regulating its use.
Certainly no one vill argue that simply because he owns a piece of
property, he has a vested interest in a given regulation at a given
4LAWD OWNERSHIP AND USE, supra note 9 at 482.
115 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, 171-172 (1956).
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point in time. The state may repeal, modify, or in any other way alter
its regulations so long as it stays within the general limits of the
police power. The owner assumes a risk with respect to what the state
might or might not do at some point in the future. Another example,
admittedly tangential, can be found in the body of negligence law.
Since it is unthinkable to make a person liable for all the consequences
of all his acts or failures to act, the law has imposed limits. In general,
the reasonable forsecability test, both as it applies to risk and causation,
is a device for the purpose of circumscribing the ambit of liability.
While on the one hand there is the social policy of making victims
whole, there is also an interest in guaranteeing that persons have a
reasonable degree of freedom of movement without fear of liability.
Can it be said, then, that just as the police power limits the ambit of
authority in the zoning area, just as the reasonable forseeability test
limits the ambit of liability in negligence law, the privity of estate and
the touch or concern requirements act to limit the liability of persons
who took land subject to promises which they never made? If this is
the case, then the importance of providing delineating elements in
some absolute sense diminishes. The court must first look to the purpose
of the promise and its reasonable degree of effectiveness in accomplish-
ing that purpose. It must weigh that promise against the chance that
it will impose an unreasonable burden upon the titles, that it will impose
an unreasonable restraint upon alienation, and that it will impose an
unfair burden upon persons who took subject to, but who never made
the promise in the first instance. The court must balance the con-
flicting social values, come to a conclusion, and then, if it chooses,
rationalize its conclusion in traditional, legal terms. There is certainly
nothing novel about this approach.
WHAT'S A DEVELOPER TO DO?
The developer, however, must have a reasonable degree of security
that his promises will in fact be enforced in the future. If he chooses
to rely upon the state to regulate its development through the exercise
of the zoning power, he runs the risk that any commitment to democracy
involves. By relying upon covenants, he must be aware of the dangers
inherent in their future enforceability. Additionally, there is the pos-
sibility that covenants may cease to be enforceable because of the
doctrine of changed conditions,5 6 or because of some kind of govern-
mental action.57 Even if the covenant gives rise to an easement, there
is no guarantee that the easement will last forever. Easements can
"See, for example,Hirsch v. Hancock, 173 Cal. App.2d 745, 343 P.2d 959 (1959).
"An inconsistent zoning ordinance nullifying a restrictive covenant is hard to imagine
since the ordinance usually allows uses which the covenant does not. Obviously, how-
ever, a more restrictive ordinance would take precedence over a less restrictive cove-
nant. See, Kosel v. Stone, 146 Mont. 218, 404 P.2d 894 (1965); R. POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY, supra note 24 at 745.
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terminate. Their termination can result from some express agreement
between the parties at some future date, a contingency which the
developer will find difficult to prevent, and they can terminate from
abandonment and misuse as well.58
The usual response is for a developer to set forth clearly his restric-
tive covenants in an agreement which becomes part of the deed. Some
type of homeowners' association is then organized which is empowered
to establish other reasonable rules and regulations as needs may require.
The developer may or may not remain active in such an association
or may or may not retain control over some of the property within the
development. If he does, he remains in a position of being able to enforce
the covenants. If he does not, he is by act of faith assuming that his
successors in interest will do the enforcing. Some developers, however,
have gone one step further. They have included in their scheme of
restrictive covenants a provision for enforcement by self-help. Usually
the privilege of exercising self-help to correct a violation of the restric-
tive covenants is accompanied with a notice requirement. Considering
the reluctance the courts have had recently with respect to their will-
ingness to accept these provisions as permissible remedies, these attempts
at guaranteed enforcement must be looked at with some suspicion.59
m'Crimmins v. Gould, 149 Cal. App.2d 666, 308 P.2d 786 (1957), was a case in which
a court found that misuse of an easement constituted an extinguishment. Professor
Powell suggests that termination is unnecessary since the servient tenant can protect
himself by self-help, a trespass action, or injunctive relief. R. POWELL, iREAL PROP-
ERTY, supra note 24 at 576. Professor Tiffany disagrees. H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY,
supra note 24 at 350-351.
"An example of this type of private remedy is to be found in Protective Covenants
of Big Sky of Montana, Inc.:
A. In the event of any violation or threatened violation of these covenants, any
owner of real property in the premises, or the Committee, may enforce these
covenants by legal proceedings in a court of law or equity, including the seeking
of injunctive relief and damages. In association with such legal proceedings or
as a separate remedy, such legal proceedings or as a separate remedy, such
owner or the Committee may enter upon the property in question and remove,
remedy or abate the violation or threatened violation after first having given
proper notice and a reasonable opportunity for the violator to take action himself
to comply with these covenants as set forth below.
B. Notice as required in paragraph 14-A above, shall be in writing and shall
be served on the person or entity concerned and shall specify the violation or
threatened violation, identify the property, demand compliance with the terms and
conditions of these covenants and shall state the action which will be taken under
paragraph 14-A above if the violation or threatened violation is not abated,
remedied or satisfied. If such notice cannot be personally served after a reason-
able effort to locate the person or entity to be served, service may be had by
posting a copy of such notice at a conspicuous place on the property which is
the subject of such violation and mailing a copy of the notice by Certified Mail,
return receipt requested, to the last known address or address of record, of the
violator. Such notice must further provide for a period of 15 days from the date
of personal service of such notice, or 30 days from the date of posting and
mailing of the same, within which compliance can be had with these covenants
before any self-help, abatement, entry or commencement of litigation as provided
in 14-A above can be commenced.
C. No owner or member of the Committee shall be liable to any person or
entity for any entry, self-help or abatement of a violation of threatened violation
of these covenants and all owners or lessees of real property shall be deemed
to have waived any and all rights or claims to or for damages for any loss or
injury resulting from action taken to abate, remedy or satisfy any violation or 17
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Nonetheless, it is the suspicion of this writer that they are being widely
employed. Not only that, examples can be found where the self-help
remedy is available for even minor infractions of rules of homeowners'
associations. One wonders what a court will do if it is faced with the
problem of a person who reenters his offending neighbor's property
while that neighbor is away on an extended vacation and repaints the
house, billing him for the cost of the job. Notice may have been pro-
vided by publication, and the neighbor returns to find a bill for a
newly painted house. Will the existence of the self-help remedy in
the restrictive covenants protect this enforcer? This is an interesting
question which, in not quite so extreme a form as this illustration, might
well arise in the not-too-distant future.60
There is no reason to suppose that the public sector has a monopoly
on wisdom when it comes to exercising land use controls. Indeed, a very
valid argument can be made for the case that Euclidian-type zoning is
responsible for the sterile nature of our homogeneous surburban tracts.
Not only that, public officials are hemmed in by police power standards
as to the nature of the controls that they may promulgate. Zoning for
aesthetic reasons has not yet gained widespread acceptance. There is
furthermore a reluctance to allow flexibility within zoning districts
particularly concerning the fact that most zoning statutes still have
uniformity requirements built into them.6 ' A developer interested in
some kind of planned unit development or a mixture of various uses
in some orderly fashion would find it difficult to fit his plan within
conventional zoning enabling statutes. Variances are possible, indeed,
often very easy to secure so long as they do not appear to be examples
threatened violation of these covenants. Exception to the above shall exist for
loss, injury or damage for intentionally wrongful acts.
D. Actual costs, expenses and reasonable attorneys' fees connected with correct-
ing, remedying, abating, preventing or removing any violation or threatened
violation of these covenants incurred either through litigation, entry or self-hel l)
shall constitute a claim by the owner or the Committee initiating such action
against the owner of the property which is the subject of such violation or
threatened violation. Such claim Rhall not, however, exceed Five Thousand Dollars
($5,000.00) for any one claim and shall be enforcable through appropriate court
action. The owner or the Committee making such claim may file a lien against
the subject property in the amount of and for the collection of the claim by
filing a verified statement of the lien with the office of the Clerk and Recorder,
Gallatin County, Montana. Such lien statement must set forth the names of the
claimant, and the owner of record of the property against which the lien is
claimed, a description of the property, the amount of the claim, the date of
the claim and a brief statement of the manner in which the costs and expenses
constituting the claim were incurred. Once filed, the lien shall remain of record
as a claim against the property until paid in full or foreclosed in the manner
otherwise provided by law, subject to rights of redemption.
For examples of the courts' reluctance to sanction self-help, at least in the landlord-
tenant setting, see, Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal.2d 597, 361 P.2d 20 (1961), and Brown
v. Grenz, 127 Mont. 49, 257 P.2d 246 (1953). A contrasting note is found in LAND
OWNERSHn AND USE, supra note 9 at 359-360.
-Due process requirements were imposed in Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972),
a case involving the exercise of self-help in repossession of personal property. Note,
Procedural Due Process v. Prejudgement Remedies, 34 MoNT. L. REV. 718 (1973).
O'Sections 11-2702 and 16-4703, R.C.M. 1947 are examples of typical uniformity re-
quirements.
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of spot zoning or contract zoning. If there is to be some reasonable
degree of certainty with respect to architectural controls, aesthetic
considerations, and flexibility of use, the developer is likely to place
substantial reliance upon the use of the restrictive covenant. He might
like to delegate the authority of enforcing these covenants to the public
sector, 62 but in the final analysis the enforcement must depend upon
either him or his successors assuming the initiative and making certain
that the promises are enforced either privately or through the courts.
Courts in their desire to preserve free alienability of land must care-
fully scrutinize these covenants. Yet, it is to be hoped that they will
not exalt technical form over substance, that they will not give renewed
emphasis to ancient rules of privity, that they will not become ensnarled
in semantic gymnastics over the niceties of the touch or concern require-
ment. The law has developed in such a way as to permit courts wide
latitude in determining which covenants are enforceable. Hopefully, this
power will be used in such a way that the private sector in the exercise
of its own particular kind of wisdom will continue to have a voice in
controlling the manner in which land is to be used.
"Interestingly enough, this can be accomplished indirectly in Montana. Title 16,
Chapter 41, R.C.M. 1947 empowers county commissioners to zone in rural areas, as a
result of which restrictive covenants are often codified. Enforcement is by injunctive
relief instituted by the county attorney.
1973]
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